Information and Price Dispersion: Theory and Evidence by Weiss, Christoph et al.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
Vol. 61, No. 2, May 2020 DOI: 10.1111/iere.12443
INFORMATION AND PRICE DISPERSION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE∗
BY DIETER PENNERSTORFER, PHILIPP SCHMIDT-DENGLER, NICOLAS SCHUTZ,
CHRISTOPH WEISS, AND BILIANA YONTCHEVA1
Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria; University of Vienna, Austria, CEPR, UK, and
WIFO, Austria; University of Mannheim, Germany, MaCCI, Germany, and CEPR, UK; Vienna
University of Economics and Business, Austria; Vienna University of Economics and Business,
Austria
Limited information is the key element generating price dispersion inmodels of homogeneous-goodsmarkets.
We show that the global relationship between information and price dispersion is an inverse-U shape. We test
this mechanism for the retail gasoline market using a new measure of information based on commuter data
from Austria. Commuters sample gasoline prices on their commuting route, providing us with spatial variation
in the share of informed consumers. Our empirical estimates are in line with the theoretical predictions. We also
quantify how information affects average prices paid and the distribution of surplus in the gasoline market.
1. INTRODUCTION
Price competition in homogeneous-goods markets rarely results in market outcomes in line
with the “law of one price.” On the contrary, price dispersion is ubiquitous in such markets, and
it cannot be fully explained by differences in location, cost, or services.
In his seminal paper, Stigler (1961) offered the first search-theoretic rationale for price
dispersion. He argued that “price dispersion is amanifestation—and, indeed, it is themeasure—
of ignorance in the market” (p. 214). Following Stigler’s seminal work, it has been shown that
price dispersion can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon in a homogeneous-goods market with
symmetric firms if consumers are not fully informed about prices—see Varian (1980) and the
literature that followed (as surveyed in Baye et al., 2006).
Not only widespread adoption of the Internet, but also of earlier innovations such as auto-
mobiles, telephones, and television has made information about prices accessible to ever more
consumers. Yet, price dispersion has anything but disappeared (Baye et al., 2006; Friberg, 2014)
and has significant distributional consequences (Kaplan and Menzio, 2015). Price dispersion
in retail gasoline has received particular attention due to the homogeneity of the product and
its cost. Consumers are upset about unexpected price differences across outlets and over time,
which has resulted in numerous inquiries into this sector by competition authorities (OECD,
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2013). Several countries have introduced restrictions on price setting,2 as well as transparency
regimes requiring retailers to report to an online platform.3
We contribute to this debate by theoretically and empirically examining the relationship be-
tween consumer information, price levels, and price dispersion.We begin by deriving the global
relationship between information, prices, and price dispersion in a “clearinghouse model,” as
developed by Varian (1980) and further refined by Stahl (1989).4 Consumers differ in their de-
gree of informedness: For some, obtaining an additional price quote is costly; others are aware
of all prices charged in the relevant market—they have access to the “clearinghouse.” The
model unambiguously implies that average prices decline as the share of informed consumers
increases—our first testable prediction.
At the very extremes, the model predicts no price dispersion: If no consumer has access to the
clearinghouse, all firms charge the monopoly price; conversely, if all consumers are informed,
the Bertrand outcome arises and all firms price at marginal cost. If instead the fraction of
informed consumers is interior, firms face a tension between charging a high price to exploit
uninformed consumers and charging a low price to attract informed consumers. This tension
gives rise to a mixed-strategy equilibrium, and therefore to price dispersion. This suggests that
price dispersion is not a monotone function of the share of informed consumers. We prove that
the Stahl (1989) model generates a global inverse-U–shaped relationship—our second testable
prediction. Importantly, our predictions on price levels and dispersion continue to obtain in a
setting where informed consumers have different (e.g., higher) demand.
We then test the model’s predictions using data on the retail gasoline market in Austria. The
challenge here is to find a good measure for the fraction of informed consumers. We construct
such a measure using detailed data on commuting behavior from the Austrian census. The
main idea is that, relative to noncommuters, commuters are likely to be better informed as they
are able to sample freely all price quotes for gasoline along their commute. Using our precise
commuter data, we thus compute the share of commuters passing by an individual gasoline
station, and interpret this share as measuring the fraction of consumers having access to the
clearinghouse in the Stahl (1989) model.
Having constructed our information measure, we combine it with quarterly data on retail
gasoline prices at the station level to study the impact of consumer information on price levels
and dispersion. Exploiting regional variation in commuting behavior, we find strong statistical
evidence in favor of a negative relationship between consumer information and price levels, and
of an inverse-U–shaped relationship between information and price dispersion. The empirical
results are robust to using various alternative measures of price dispersion, taking alternative
approaches to local market delineation, accounting for potential spatial correlation in the resid-
uals of the estimating equation, taking into account different degrees of consumer informedness,
and relaxing parametric restrictions.
We believe that our empirical setting is close in spirit to the seminal clearinghousemodels and
permits a direct test of those theories for the following reasons: (1) Firms’ abilities to obfuscate
consumers’ search and learning efforts are limited in this market; (2) unlike other measures of
information, commuting is not correlated with firms’ ability to monitor each other and collude;5
(3) gasoline is a homogeneous product and seller characteristics can be adequately controlled
for; (4) we observe substantial variation in our measure of the share of informed consumers,
enabling us to test the global prediction derived from theory; (5) a consumer’s decision to
commute—and thus to become better informed—is not determined by regional differences in
price dispersion, allowing a causal interpretation of our empirical results.
2 This includes Australia (Byrne and de Roos, 2017), Austria (Obradovits, 2014), and Canada (Carranza et al., 2015).
3 This includes Australia (Byrne and de Roos, 2017), Chile (Luco, 2019), Germany (Dewenter et al., 2017), and Italy
(Rossi and Chintagunta, 2018).
4 Varian’s (1980) model corresponds to a special case of Stahl’s (1989) model without search.
5 For instance, Albæk et al. (1997) and Luco (2019) show that prices actually increased after the introduction of a
transparency regime.
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Our article is related to several strands of literature. We contribute to the literature on
clearinghouse models, initiated by Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989), by studying the relationship
between consumer information and the equilibrium price distribution in such models.6 The
literature has observed that price dispersion is not a monotone function of the fraction of
informed consumers (see Baye et al., 2006, Conclusion 3) and conjectured, based on numerical
simulations, that the Stahl (1989) model gives rise to an inverse-U–shaped relationship between
these two variables (see Chandra and Tappata, 2008). We contribute an analytical proof for this
conjecture, extending an earlier result by Tappata (2009) derived in the Varian (1980) model
without search. We also prove the result for measures of price dispersion that go beyond the
value of information (VOI) measure used by Tappata (2009).
A strand of literature has relied on Internet usage or adoption to measure the fraction of
consumers having access to the clearinghouse. Analyzing price dispersion in the market for
life insurance, Brown and Goolsbee (2002) use variation in the share of consumers searching
on the Internet as their measure of consumer information. They find that the early increase in
Internet usage has resulted in an increase in price dispersion at very low levels and in a decrease
later on. Focusing on the Internet book market, Tang et al. (2010) observe that an increase in
shopbot use is correlated with a decrease in price dispersion over time. Sengupta and Wiggins
(2014) find no significant relationship between price dispersion and the share of Internet usage
for airline fares.
Earlier literature has, however, identified anumber of issues that can arisewhenusing Internet
usage or access as a proxy for consumer information. First, Baye and Morgan (2001) stress
that consumers’ decisions to use price comparison websites are endogenous. As consumers’
expected gains from obtaining information from such platforms increase with price dispersion,
a correlation between the share of Internet users and price dispersion cannot be given a causal
interpretation.7 Second, Ellison and Ellison (2005, 2009) question the extent to which the
Internet has made consumers better informed. They provide evidence that firms in online
markets often engage in bait-and-switch and obfuscation strategies that frustrate consumer
search. Our article sidesteps these difficulties by focusing on an offline market and constructing
a novel measure of consumer information based on commuting patterns.
Our empirical approach differs from that in Sorensen (2000) and Chandra and Tappata
(2011), who compare price dispersion for different products and argue that search intensity
differs across those different products. Sorensen (2000) finds that prescription drugs that must
be purchased more frequently exhibit lower price–cost margins and less price dispersion. He
interprets purchase frequency as measuring the benefit of becoming informed—this interpreta-
tion is valid provided prices stay constant over several purchases.8 Chandra and Tappata (2011)
argue that people owning expensive cars tend to purchase higher-octane fuel, implying that
the opportunity cost of search is higher in markets for higher-octane grade. They find that the
impact of octane grade on price dispersion is consistent with a model of endogenous access
to the clearinghouse. By contrast, we focus on a single product, diesel, construct explicitly a
measure of consumer information, and relate it to price dispersion.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the clearinghouse
model and derives testable prediction on the relationship between consumer information and
6 In the Stahl (1989) model, the equilibrium price distribution is common knowledge, and the nonshoppers observe
a first price quote for free before engaging in sequential search with costless recall. Extensions include models where
the first price quote is costly (Janssen et al., 2005), recall is costly (Janssen and Parakhonyak, 2014), nonshoppers do
not know the firms’ underlying production costs (Janssen et al., 2011), nonshoppers only know the support of the price
distribution (Parakhonyak, 2014), and search costs are heterogeneous (Stahl, 1996; Chen and Zhang, 2011).
7 Indeed, Byrne and deRoos (2017) provide empirical evidence that consumers are more likely to use a gasoline price
comparison website when prices are more dispersed. Such websites did not exist during our sample period (1999–2005).
8 Daily data in Loy et al. (2018) on a subsample of 282 gasoline stations in Austria between January 2003 and
December 2004 show that the median gasoline station changes prices at least twice a week, and that 90% of stations
change prices at least once a week. Prices are thus very unlikely to be the same between two purchases. Differences
in demand will affect the probability of purchase instead of search costs per purchase. Our theoretical predictions are
robust to different purchase frequency (see Remark 2 in Section 2).
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prices. Section 3 describes the industry, the retail price data, and our construction of a measure
of informed consumers based on commuting patterns. Section 4 presents the empirical results.
Section 5 provides quantitative implications and concludes.
2. INFORMATION AND PRICE DISPERSION IN CLEARINGHOUSE MODELS
In this section,weuse aunit-demandversionof theStahl (1989) searchmodel,which subsumes
the Varian (1980) model of sales as a special case, to obtain predictions on the relationship
between consumer information and firms’ pricing behavior. Our main testable predictions are
derived in Subsection 2.1. Further results on heterogeneous consumer demand, the role of
market structure, and alternative measures of price dispersion are stated in Subsection 2.2.
2.1. Main Testable Predictions. There is a finite number of symmetric firms, N > 1, selling a
homogeneous product. They face constant marginal cost c and compete in prices. There is a unit
mass of consumers with unit demand for the product and willingness to pay v. A shareμ ∈ (0, 1)
of consumers, referred to as “informed” consumers or “shoppers,” observes all prices through
the clearinghouse and buys at the lowest price provided it does not exceed their willingness
to pay. The remaining fraction of consumers (1 − μ), referred to as “non-shoppers,” engages
in sequential search with costless recall: The first price sample is free; thereafter, each sample
costs s > 0.
2.1.1. Equilibrium price distribution. It is well known that the unique symmetric equilibrium
is inmixed strategies. The equilibriumprice distributionF (·) ensures that each firm is indifferent
between setting any price p in the support [p , p ] and setting p¯ :
(p − c)
(
μ(1 − F (p))N−1 + (1 − μ) 1
N
)
= (p − c)(1 − μ) 1
N
.(1)
The first term in large brackets on the left-hand side corresponds to the expected quantity sold to
shoppers (which the firm serves with probability (1 − F (p))N−1). The second term corresponds
to the quantity sold to the the firm’s (1 − μ)/N nonshoppers.Manipulating condition (1) yields:
F (p) = 1 −
(
1 − μ
μ
1
N
p − p
p − c
) 1
N−1
(2)
for all p ∈ [p , p ]. Solving for F (p) = 0 gives the lower bound of the support:
p = c+ p¯ − c
1 + μ1−μN
.
The upper bound of the support depends on the nonshoppers’ optimal search behavior, which
satisfies a stationary reservation price property. The reservation price ρ is such that nonshoppers
are indifferent between purchasing at ρ, and paying the search cost to receive a new price quote
drawn from F :
v − ρ = v − s−
∫ ρ
p
pdF (p) − (1 − F (ρ))ρ.
Janssen et al. (2005) and Janssen et al. (2011) show that ρ = c+ s/(1 −A), where
A=
∫ 1
0
dz
1 + μ1−μNzN−1
∈ (0, 1).
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NOTES: The relationship between μ and VOI induced by the Varian (1980) model, where nonshoppers cannot search, is
illustrated by the solid line in both panels. The relationship induced by the Stahl (1989) model, illustrated by the dashed
line, depends on the search cost s. For low enough μ, the reservation price is not binding and the two models coincide.
When s is small (left panel), the reservation price ρ starts to bind for low levels of μ, implying that μ̂ = μ. For larger
search costs, ρ starts to bind for larger μ only, so that the Varian and Stahl models only differ after price dispersion
peaks: μ̂ > μ. The model parameters are N = 2, and v − c = 2.
FIGURE 1
ILLUSTRATION OF PROPOSITION 1
The upper bound of the support is therefore given by p = min(ρ, v).
Observe that the gain from search (gross of the search cost s) is at most v − c, since no firm
ever prices above v or below c. This implies that if the search cost is too high, namely, s ≥ v − c,
then nonshoppers never find searching profitable and our model is equivalent to the Varian
(1980) model. In this case, ρ > v and p = v for all (μ,N).
If instead s < v − c, then the nonshoppers’ threat of searchingmay constrain the firms’ pricing.
Specifically, as ρ is strictly decreasing in μ and has limits +∞ and c+ s in 0 and 1, there exists
a unique μ̂ ∈ (0, 1) such that p = v if μ ≤ μ̂ and p = ρ if μ ≥ μ̂. Intuitively, when μ is high,
firms compete fiercely to attract the shoppers, resulting in a low expected price. A nonshopper
receiving a high price sample would find it worthwhile to pay the search cost s to receive a
significantly lower price sample. The firm that charges the high price would then sell neither to
the shoppers nor to its nonshoppers, resulting in zero profits.9
We have thus fully characterized the unique symmetric equilibrium: Firms draw their prices
from the distribution function F defined in Equation (2), with p = ρ if s < v − c and μ ≤ μ̂,
and p = v otherwise. Figure 1 illustrates how s and the possibility to search in the Stahl (1989)
model affect the price distribution relative to the Varian (1980) model.
2.1.2. Price level. The expected price is given by
E(p) =
∫ min(ρ,v)
p
pdF (p) = c+ (min(ρ, v) − c)A,(3)
where the second equality follows by using Equation (2) and the change of variables z=
1 − F (p). As A and ρ are both decreasing in μ, we immediately obtain that the expected price
decreases with the fraction of shoppers. We thus obtain a first testable prediction:
9 A perhaps surprising feature of the Stahl (1989) model is that, although the nonshoppers’ ability to search can
constrain thefirms’ pricing behavior, searchnever occurs on the equilibriumpath. Searchwould takeplace in equilibrium
if the nonshopperswere (sufficiently) heterogeneous in their search costs (as in, e.g., Stahl, 1996),whichwehave assumed
away for simplicity.
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REMARK 1. The expected price E(p) is declining in the proportion of informed consumers μ.
Intuitively, as the proportion of shoppers increases, firms are increasingly tempted to attract
them by charging low prices, resulting in a first-order stochastic dominance shift toward lower
prices (see Stahl, 1989).
2.1.3. Price dispersion. Various measures of price dispersion have been used in the litera-
ture. In this subsection, we focus on one common measure, the VOI, which corresponds to a
consumer’s expected benefit of becoming informed. (See subsection 3.1 in Baye et al., 2006,
for a discussion of this and other measures of price dispersion.) In equilibrium, the expected
payoff of a nonshopper is given by v − E(p), whereas a shopper receives an expected payoff
of v − E(pmin), where pmin ≡ min1≤i≤N pi is the minimum price in the market. The VOI is
therefore given by:
VOI = E(p − pmin) =
∫ p
p
p
(
1 −N(1 − F (p))N−1
)
dF (p).(4)
Substituting the equilibrium price distribution (2) into Equation (4) and applying again the
change of variables z= 1 − F (p) yields:
VOI =
∫ 1
0
(
c+ p − c
1 + μ1−μNzN−1
)(
1 −NzN−1)dz,
= (min(ρ, v) − c)
(
A− 1 − μ
μ
(1 −A)
)
.
An immediate observation is that the relationship between information and price dispersion
is nonmonotonic. This holds as the VOI vanishes when μ tends to zero or one, whereas VOI
is strictly positive for every μ in (0, 1).10,11 The following proposition, which delivers a sec-
ond testable prediction, characterizes the global relationship between information and price
dispersion:
PROPOSITION 1. There is an inverse-U–shaped relationship between price dispersion E(p −
pmin) and the proportion of informed consumers μ: There exists a μ ∈ (0, 1) such that price dis-
persion is increasing in μ on (0, μ) and decreasing in μ on (μ, 1).
PROOF. Lemma 1 in Tappata (2009) implies that A− 1−μ
μ
(1 −A) is strictly concave in μ.
Combining this with the fact that VOI tends to 0 as μ tends to 0 and 1 proves the proposition for
the case s ≥ v − c. Next, assume s < v − c. Then, VOI is strictly concave on the interval (0, μ̂),
and we now claim that it is strictly decreasing on (μ̂, 1). If μ ≥ μ̂, then p = ρ and VOI simplifies
to s( A1−A − 1−μμ ), which is indeed strictly decreasing in μ by Lemma A.1, stated and proven in
Appendix A.1. This concludes the proof of the proposition.
10 To see this, notice that limμ→0A= 1, limμ→1A= 0, and
lim
μ→0
1 − μ
μ
(1 −A) = lim
μ→0
∫ 1
0
NzN−1
1 + μ1−μNzN−1
dz= 1.
11 The result that VOI vanishes when μ = 0 and 1 but is strictly positive when μ is interior continues to hold in the
extensions of the Stahl model mentioned in Footnote 6. Janssen et al. (2005) is a notable exception: In that paper, due
to the first price sample being costly as well, it can be shown that VOI is constant and strictly positive over (0, μ̂) and
strictly decreasing over (μ̂, 1). Note however that in that paper, a positive mass of nonshoppers drops out of the market
when μ is low—a prediction that appears unappealing in our empirical application to retail gasoline.
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We now provide a brief sketch of the proof of Lemma A.1. We first argue that s( A1−A − 1−μμ )
is strictly decreasing in μ on (0, 1) if and only if B(x)1−B(x) − 1x is strictly decreasing in x on (0,∞),
where B(x) = ∫ 10 dz1+xNzN−1 . In turn, this is equivalent to B(x) > (x) for all x > 0, where (x) is
the smallest root of a quadratic polynomial. Using a third-order Taylor approximation, we show
that B(x) > (x) when x is in the neighborhood of 0. Next, we show that B(·) is the solution of
a differential equation, and that (·) is a subsolution of the same differential equation. From
this, we can conclude that B(x) > (x) for all x > 0. We refer the reader to Appendix A.1 for
details. 
To see the intuition behind this result, consider starting at μ = 0, where all firms charge
the monopoly price v and there is no price dispersion. As μ increases, firms have an incentive
to charge lower prices to capture the shoppers. Hence, the lower bound of the distribution
shifts down, the support widens, and dispersion increases. As μ increases further, more mass
shifts toward the lower bound. This effect tends to offset the support-widening effect, so that
eventually price dispersion falls. In the case μ ≥ μ̂, the reservation price ρ is binding, and
therefore, both the upper bound and the lower bound of the distribution shift down: When
firms are constrained by the optimal search behavior of nonshoppers, the support widens less
as μ increases. Consequently, price dispersion decreases for all μ ≥ μ̂. The argument is also
illustrated in Figure 1.
2.2. Further Results.
2.2.1. Heterogeneous demand. In our empirical application to retail gasoline, where shop-
pers are proxied by commuters, shoppers’ and nonshoppers’ demand may well differ systemat-
ically. The following remark shows that our testable predictions (Remark 1 and Proposition 1)
continue to obtain if shoppers have higher (or lower) demand than nonshoppers:
REMARK 2. Consider the following modification of the Stahl (1989) model: A shopper is
willing to pay v with probability φ ∈ (0, 1], and 0 with complementary probability 1 − φ; a
nonshopper is willing to pay v (respectively, 0) with probability ψ ∈ (0, 1] (respectively, 1 − ψ).
There is still a decreasing relationship between the expected price and the share of shoppers,
and an inverse-U–shaped relationship between price dispersion and the share of shoppers.
PROOF. Indifference condition (1) becomes:
(p − c)
(
μφ(1 − F (p))N−1 + (1 − μ)ψ 1
N
)
= (p¯ − c)(1 − μ)ψ 1
N
.(5)
Define ν(μ) ≡ μφ
μφ+(1−μ)ψ and note that ν
′ > 0. Condition (5) is then equivalent to
(p − c)
(
ν(1 − F (p))N−1 + (1 − ν) 1
N
)
= (p¯ − c)(1 − ν) 1
N
,
which is equivalent to condition (1) if we replace μ by ν. The equilibrium mixed strategy in
the heterogeneous-demand model with proportion of shoppers μ is therefore the same as the
equilibrium mixed strategy in the Stahl model with proportion of shoppers ν(μ).
Let VOI(μ) be the VOI in the Stahl model. The VOI in the heterogeneous-demand model
is V˜OI(μ) = VOI(ν(μ)). As ν(·) is strictly increasing and VOI(·) is strictly quasi-concave by
Proposition 1, V˜OI is strictly quasi-concave. Moreover, as ν(0) = 0 and ν(1) = 1, V˜OI(0) =
V˜OI(1) = 0, and so V˜OI is inverse-U shaped. By the same argument, the expected price in the
heterogeneous-demand model decreases with μ. 
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2.2.2. Alternative measures of price dispersion. We now show that our prediction of an
inverse-U–shaped relationship between information and price dispersion continues to obtain
with other commonly used measures of dispersion. We focus on two alternative measures: the
standard deviation of prices and the expected sample range (defined as E(pmax − pmin), where
pmax = max1≤i≤N pi).
PROPOSITION 2. There is an inverse-U–shaped relationship between the standard deviation of
prices and the proportion of informed consumers.
PROOF. As in the proof of Proposition 1, we prove the result by exploiting the properties
of super- and subsolutions of a certain differential equation. See Appendix S1.1.2 (available
online) for details. 
REMARK 3. There is an inverse-U shaped relationship between the expected sample range
and the proportion of informed consumers.
PROOF. See Appendix S1.2.2 for analytical proofs for low N. Simulations suggest that the
result also holds for higher N. 
2.2.3. The role of the number of firms. The Varian and Stahl models have the surprising
feature that the equilibrium expected price, E(p), increases with the number of firms (Morgan
et al., 2006; Janssen et al., 2011).12 Wedonot think this prediction should be taken literally for the
following reasons. First, using a version of the Varianmodel with a richer information structure,
Lach and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2017) show theoretically and empirically that the impact of N on
E(p) depends on the entire distribution of consumer information and how that distribution
changes with N. Under the natural assumption that an increase in N lowers the share of
consumers who observe one price only and increases the average number of prices observed
in the market, they find that an increase in N tends to lower E(p). Second, in our empirical
application, it seems likely that an increase in N, which, everything else equal, reduces the
average driving distance between two gas stations in the market, will also lower the search cost
s, resulting in lower prices.
Similarly, Morgan et al. (2006) and Janssen et al. (2011) show that E(pmin) is nonincreasing
in N, implying that VOI increases with N. Due to the concerns raised above, this prediction
should also be taken with a grain of salt.13
3. INDUSTRY BACKGROUND AND DATA
3.1. Commuters as Informed Consumers. Themain idea behind our measure of information
is that commuters can freely sample prices along their daily commuting path. The idea that
commuters have lower search costs for gasoline dates back at least toMarvel (1976), who argues
that “[T]he low search costs [of commuters] arise simply because stations can be canvassed
along the route taken to work with only slight additional effort and delay” (p. 1043 f.). A survey
among German car drivers shows that commuters purchase from a larger number of gasoline
stations, indicating that commuters indeed sample more prices than noncommuters.14 (Recall
12 Another question that arises is that of the interaction between μ and N. Simulations suggest that the cross-partial
derivative ∂2E(p)/∂μ∂N is negative when μ is large and N is small, and positive otherwise. We refer the reader to
Appendix S1.3 for details and further comparative statics.
13 In Appendix S1.2.3, we show analytically that the expected sample range increases with N. Numerical simulations
suggest that the standard deviation of prices is inverse-U shaped in N (see Appendix S1.1.3).
14 The survey, which was conducted among 1,005 individuals by the German automobile club ADAC between
December 2011 and January 2012, finds that nearly half of all noncommuters (46%) always fuel at the same station,
although this is the case for only 29% of all commuters. A descriptive analysis is provided in Dewenter et al. (2012).
We thank Ralf Dewenter for providing us with those numbers.
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from Remark 2 that our predictions continue to obtain if commuters have a higher demand for
fuel.)
We therefore rely on the share of long-distance commuters as a measure of the proportion
of shoppers in the market. We implement this idea by sorting the potential consumers of a
given station into two groups based on the length and regularity of their commute. Long-
distance commuters are defined as individuals who commute to work by car on a daily basis
and go beyond the boundaries of their own municipality. Our estimate of the share of informed
consumers at a given gasoline station depends on the relative size of this group compared to
the total size of the station’s market.
3.1.1. Commuter flows. According to the 2001 census, 2,051,000 people in Austria go to
work by car on a daily basis. For 1,396,426 of these people, the commute involves regular travel
beyond the boundaries of their home municipality. We refer to these consumers as informed
consumers. The Austrian Statistical Office provides detailed information on the number of
individuals commuting from an origin municipality o to a different destination municipality
d for each of the 2,381 administrative units in Austria. All commuters are assigned to an
origin–destination pair of municipalities based on their home and workplace addresses.15 As
municipalities are generally very small regional units, we are able to create a detailed description
of the commuting patterns in Austria. The average (median) municipality is 13.8 (9.4) square-
miles large, and has 3,373 (1,575) inhabitants, 1.19 (1) gasoline stations, and commuter flows to
51 (32) other municipalities.
In order to assign commuter flows to gasoline stations, we merge the municipality-level data
on the spatial distribution of commuters with data on the location of each station within the road
network using a GIS software (WiGeoNetwork Analyst, ArcGIS). This allows us to determine
the number of individuals who reside in the municipality where a station i is located and
commute to a different municipality. We denote this number by Couti , the number of individuals
commuting out of station i’s municipality. Commuters who work in station i’s municipality but
live in a different municipality also belong to the station’s informed potential consumers. We
denote the corresponding number by Cini , the number of consumers commuting into station
i’s municipality.
For a completemeasure of informed consumers, we also need to take into account commuters
passing by a station directly, despite neither working nor living in the municipality where it
is located. We refer to these consumers as transit (tr) commuters. We assume that transit
consumers are familiar with the prices of gasoline stations located directly on their commuting
path, but not with the entire gasoline market in the municipality.
In order to obtain a measure Ctri of transit consumers, we use ArcGIS’s shortest path algo-
rithm. The algorithm computes the optimal route from origin municipality o to destination d
by minimizing the time required to complete the trip. As the location of each consumer is only
known at the municipality level, we approximate the location of the residence and workplace
of commuters with the address of the administrative center of the municipalities (usually the
town hall) when calculating distances. Given the small size of the municipalities, we can deter-
mine quite accurately which road transit commuters take. Our prediction will be less accurate
in densely populated municipalities as high population densities usually go hand in hand with
more complex infrastructure. We therefore drop gasoline stations located in Vienna from the
sample in our main specification.
3.1.2. Assigning commuter flows to gasoline stations. We use the shortest path algorithm to
determine whether a commuter flow passes through a station i. We do so by comparing the
length of the optimal route from the origin to the destination municipality (distod) with the
length of the optimal route that passes through the station (see Figure 2). If the difference in
15 The data were prepared by theAustrian FederalMinistry for Transport, Innovation and Technology for the project
“Verkehrsprognose O¨sterreich 2025+.” We thank the Ministry for sharing the data with us.
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NOTES: We illustrate the commuter flow assignment using two stations in the municipality of Kremsmu¨nster. Commuter
flows from and to Kremsmu¨nster are automatically assigned to the two stations located there (33 + 38 + 68 + 9
commuters are added to the share of informed consumers). The assignment of the one commuter fromRohr to Sattledt
to one of the stations (e.g., Lagerhaus) is based on the distance of the time-minimizing path from Rohr to Sattledt
(12.9 km). This distance is compared to the distance from Rohr to the station (5.2 km) and the distance from the station
to Sattledt (7.8 km). If the commuter passes the Lagerhaus station in transit, he will have to travel 5.2 + 7.8 = 13 km,
which is 100 m more than he would travel otherwise. As 100 m is within our critical distance, we count the commuter
as one of the informed consumers in the Lagerhaus station’s market.
FIGURE 2
COMMUTER FLOWS [COLOR FIGURE CAN BE VIEWED AT WILEYONLINELIBRARY.COM]
distance between those two routes is less than a critical value (dist), then the commuter flow
may pass by the station and, as such, plays a role in the local market.16 Specifically, we assign
the commuter flow from municipality o to municipality d to station i whenever
distoi + distid − distod < dist,(6)
where distoi (distid) is the distance of the optimal route between o and i (i and d). For our main
specification, we use a small critical distance (dist = 250m) to ensure that the price of the station
can be sampled without turning off the road (i.e., the station is visible without deviating from
the commuting route).
If the distance between the origin and the destination municipality is large, there may be
multiple routes whose length is similar to that of the optimal one. In this case, not all stations
satisfying Equation (6) are necessarily on the same route. In order to account for this, we
weight transit commuters for a particular station by the fraction of possible routes passing
by this particular gasoline station, which boils down to assuming that consumers randomize
uniformly over those routes. The details of the weighting scheme are given in Appendix A.2.
The results from our algorithm show that consumers pass by a substantial number of gasoline
stations: The average (median) commuter passes by 20 (11) gasoline stations, and 90% of
commuters pass by at least two gasoline stations.
Using the methodology outlined above, we construct the following measure for the total
number of informed consumers in the market of station i (Ii):
Ii = Couti + Cini + Ctri .
16 We allow for this slack variable in distance as the translation of the address data to coordinates and the mapping
of these coordinates might not be precise. Moreover, stations located on an intersection might be mapped on either the
main or the intersecting road. Note that a critical value of dist = 250 m means that a station is on the commuting path
if it is located less than 125 m off the optimal route.
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TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE SHARE OF INFORMED CONSUMERS
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
μ 0.577 0.147 0.192 0.967
We approximate the number of uninformed consumers in the market (Ui) with the number of
employed individuals who live in the station’s municipality and do not regularly commute over
long distances by car.17 We can then calculate a station-specific proxy for the share of informed
consumers in station i’s market:
μi = IiUi + Ii .
Table 1 shows summary statistics on the share of informed consumers. The mean value of
our information measure lies close to the 60% mark.18 This skewness toward larger values in-
dicates that commuter flows account for a significant fraction of the gasoline stations’ potential
customers. In contrast to other empirical studies on the effects of information on price disper-
sion, we observe large cross-sectional variation, with the share of informed consumers ranging
from 19% to 97%, thus covering a substantial range of feasible values. This significant spatial
variation allows us to test the global predictions derived in Section 2. Only very low values of μ
are not part of our sample.
In general, the share of commuters is below average in very rural areas (surrounded by other
rural municipalities) and in larger towns or cities with many residents employed within the
city boundaries. Consumers are best informed in suburban municipalities, where a large share
of employed individuals commute to the agglomeration area nearby. Additionally, gasoline
stations located in those municipalities often face many transit commuters, passing by those
municipalities when commuting to the city.
The distribution of our information measure over the entire country is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 4 highlights symptomatic differences in the composition of the information measure:
The figures show the locations of stations in a medium-sized town (depicted by the shaded area)
and its surrounding municipalities. The share of informed consumers μ for stations located in
the town is mainly driven by in-commuters (Figure 4a), whereas the share of out-commuters
is higher for stations located outside (Figure 4b). Transit commuters are negligible for stations
inside the town (Figure 4c), and are of heterogeneous importance for stations located outside,
depending on whether a particular station is located on a busy commuting route. The over-
all share of informed consumers μ is somewhat smaller for stations located inside the town
(Figure 4d).
3.2. Diesel Prices and Stations. Our empirical analysis focuses on the retail diesel market in
Austria.19 This market is particularly suitable for our purpose: Diesel is a fairly homogeneous
product with the main source of differentiation being spatial location, which is easily controlled
for. Moreover, as consumers visit gasoline stations primarily to purchase fuel, our analysis is
unlikely to be confounded by consumers purchasingmultiple products (seeHosken et al., 2008).
17 We follow this approach due to lack of better data on, for example, passenger vehicle registrations at the munici-
pality level. Given the localized character of competition and the assumed lack of mobility for uninformed consumers,
a more narrow definition of Ui would be preferable, especially for very large municipalities.
18 Although we do not have evidence from Austria to validate our measure externally, the abovementioned survey
fromGermany (Dewenter et al., 2012, table 8) shows that 59% of respondents compare prices either “always” or “most
of the time,” whereas the remaining 41% compare prices either “rarely” or “never.”
19 Unlike in North America, diesel-engine vehicles are most popular, accounting for more than 50% of registered
passenger vehicles in Austria in 2005 (Statistik Austria, 2006).
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Range of µ
<0.2
0.2−0.4
0.4−0.6
0.6−0.8
>0.8
NOTES: The figure illustrates the share of informed consumers μ at the municipal level. For municipalities with multiple
stations, we compute the average value of μ across all stations in the municipality. In municipalities without gasoline
stations, the number of informed consumers is approximated by the sum of in- and out-commuters. Data on Vienna
are excluded.
FIGURE 3
REGIONAL VARIATION IN THE SHARE OF INFORMED CONSUMERS
We use quarterly data on diesel prices at the gasoline station level from October 1999
to March 2005. Prices from each station were collected by the Austrian Chamber of Labor
(“Arbeiterkammer”) within three days in each time period, on weekdays. We merge the price
data with information on the geographical location of all 2,814 gasoline stations as well as
their characteristics: the number of pumps, whether the station has service bays, a convenience
store, etc.20 Retail prices are nominal and measured in euro cents per liter, including fuel tax
(a per unit tax) and value added tax. Overall, these taxes amount to about 55% of the total
diesel price. Unfortunately, the Austrian Chamber of Labor did not obtain prices for all active
gasoline stations in each quarter. As there is no systematic pattern for whether a particular
station was sampled in a given quarter, we are not concerned with selection issues. We do
control for unsampled competitors in a given market in the price-dispersion regressions.
In order to characterize the spatial distribution of suppliers and measure distances between
gasoline stations, we collect information about the structure of the road network. Using data
from ArcData Austria and the ArcGIS extension WIGeoNetwork, the geographical location
of the gasoline stations is linked to information on the Austrian road system.21
3.3. Measuring Price Dispersion. Wenowdescribe howwe calculatemeasures of dispersion.
Belowwe explain howwe construct “residual” prices, define localmarkets and variousmeasures
of price dispersion, and investigate temporal price variability.
3.3.1. Residual prices. Although diesel fuel is a homogeneous product, gasoline stations
differ in their locations, the services they provide, and other characteristics. This heterogeneity
20 The information on gasoline station characteristics was collected by the company Experian Catalist in August
2003. See http://www.catalist.com for company details.
21 We further supplement the individual data with demographic data (e.g., population density) of the municipality
where the gasoline station is located. This information is collected by theAustrian StatisticalOffice (“StatistikAustria”).
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NOTES: All panels show the same map section of Austria. The shaded area depicts the town of Steyr, a medium-sized
town with about 40,000 inhabitants and 20,000 employees, surrounded by smaller municipalities. Major roads are
indicated by solid lines. The circles, indicating the location of gas stations, are colored with different shades of gray,
depending on the share of commuters associated with the respective station. Darker shades correspond to higher
commuter shares.
FIGURE 4
COMPOSITION OF THE INFORMATION MEASURE
is likely to explain part of the price dispersion we observe in the data. The challenge is thus to
obtain a measure of price dispersion that removes those sources of heterogeneity. We follow
the literature by computing the residuals of a price equation and interpreting those residuals as
the price of a homogeneous product.22 In order to obtain “cleaned” prices, we exploit the panel
nature of our data following Lach (2002) and run a two-way fixed effects panel regression of
“raw” gasoline prices (prit) on seller (ζi) and time (χt) fixed effects:
prit = α + ζi + χt + uit.(7)
We focus on the residual variation, interpreting the residual price pit ≡ uˆit as the price of
a homogeneous product after controlling for time-invariant station-specific effects and fluctu-
ations in prices common to all stations. We are aware of the risk of misspecification bias in
this regression: The results are only valid “if station fixed effects are additively separable from
stations’ costs” (Chandra and Tappata, 2011, p. 693). We therefore also examine the robustness
of our results to using raw prices.
22 See, for example, Lach (2002), Barron et al. (2004), Bahadir-Lust et al. (2007), Hosken et al. (2008), or Lewis
(2008). Wildenbeest (2011) shows how to account for vertical differentiation.
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TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON MEASURES OF PRICE DISPERSION
Two Miles ROL 50% Municipality
Local Market Delineation Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Residual Prices
VOIM 0.725 (0.781) 0.874 (0.938) 0.847 (0.902)
VOI 0.723 (1.095) 0.874 (1.243) 0.847 (1.204)
Range 1.467 (1.526) 1.762 (1.783) 1.725 (1.771)
SDM 0.539 (0.546) 0.584 (0.564) 0.571 (0.556)
AD 0.466 (0.608) 0.499 (0.648) 0.486 (0.632)
Raw Prices
VOIM 0.747 (0.960) 0.946 (1.216) 0.900 (1.123)
VOI 0.749 (1.355) 0.946 (1.609) 0.900 (1.536)
Range 1.546 (2.028) 2.010 (2.538) 1.951 (2.513)
SDM 0.579 (0.736) 0.668 (0.812) 0.653 (0.819)
AD 0.498 (0.797) 0.560 (0.893) 0.548 (0.892)
Number of Rival Firms (Nc) 6.965 (6.415) 13.768 (19.144) 13.781 (19.145)
Number of Rival Firms with Prices (Nco) 4.428 (4.351) 7.893 (10.037) 7.920 (10.054)
Number of Obervations 14,851 13,980 14,037
Descriptive Statistics for Trimmed Range Only:
Residual Prices
Trimmed Range 0.881 (0.921) 1.232 (1.164) 1.210 (1.149)
Raw Prices
Trimmed Range 0.879 (1.226) 1.279 (1.525) 1.255 (1.529)
Number of Rival Firms (Nc) 10.560 (6.769) 22.695 (21.693) 22.682 (21.662)
Number of Rival Firms with Prices (Nco) 7.030 (4.505) 13.012 (10.946) 13.035 (10.943)
Number of Obervations 7,996 7,840 7,895
NOTES: The sample is restricted to market quarters where at least two prices are observed. For the trimmed range,
observations are restricted to market quarters where at least four prices are observed.
3.3.2. Local markets. We connect each station location to the Austrian road network. Local
markets are defined at the station level. We use two distinct approaches to delineate markets.
In the first specification, each local market contains the location itself and all rivals within a
critical driving distance of twomiles. Similar approaches have been used in earlier work on retail
gasoline markets (see, e.g., Hastings, 2004; Chandra and Tappata, 2011).23 We depart from the
existing literature by using driving distances instead of Euclidean distances. Local markets are
thus not characterized by circles, but by a delineated part of the road network.
In the second specification, we make use of our data on commuting patterns to define local
markets: Two stations are considered to be part of the same local market if the share of potential
consumers they have in common (the “relative overlap,” ROL, between these two stations)
exceeds a certain threshold. On average, this approach tends to lead to larger local markets
than the critical driving distance approach (see Table 2), although this is not necessarily true
for individual markets. A detailed description of the ROL approach and a comparison between
the two approaches is provided in Appendix A.2.
3.3.3. Measures of price dispersion. Severalmeasures of pricedispersionhavebeenproposed
in the literature. We focus first on the “value of information” (VOI). As discussed in Section 2,
this is a commonly usedmeasure andProposition 1 is based on thismetric. TheVOI in gas station
i’s local market, mi, is the difference between the expected price and the expected minimum
price in the market: VOIi = E(pmi) − E(pmimin). Although the estimate of E(pmimin) is given by
pmi(1) (the first-order statistic of prices sampled in market mi), there are two possibilities to
23 We face the common problem in the literature that our theoretical model delivers predictions for isolated markets,
whereas the markets we define for our empirical analysis overlap with each other. We address this issue by extensively
examining the robustness of our results to market definition.
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construct E(pmi). A first possibility is to use station i’s price as the expected price: E(pmi) = pi
and VOIi = pi − pmi(1). Another possibility is to follow Chandra and Tappata (2011) and use
the average local market price pmi , so that E(pmi) = pmi and VOIMi = pmi − pmi(1) (where the
superscriptM stands for “market”).
Another common measure of price dispersion, explored in Subsection 2.2, is the sample
range: the difference between the highest and the lowest price, that is, Ri = pmi(N) − pmi(1). As this
measure is strongly influenced by outliers, we also use the trimmed range TRi = pmi(N−1) − pmi(2),
that is, the difference between the (N − 1)-th and the second-order statistic. A disadvantage of
the latter measure is that it can only be computed in local markets with at least four firms.
As VOI, R, and TR are based on extreme values, these measures depend heavily on the
number of firms in the local market: Even if the price distribution is not affected by the number
of firms, the expected values of these measures of price dispersion increase with the number
of stations. Measures that are less dependent on the number of firms compare the price of a
station (or of all stations) with the local market average. Similar to VOI, we can compare either
the price of station i or the prices of all stations within a local market with the average (local)
market price. In the former case, the measure is the absolute difference between the price of
station i and the average market price, ADi = |pi − pmi |. In the latter case, the measure is
the standard deviation, SDmii =
√∑
j∈mi(p j − pmi)2/(Nmi), where Nmi is the number of firms in
station i’s market.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for these price dispersion measures for different market
delineations, namely, using a critical driving distance of two miles, an ROL threshold of 50%,
and administrative boundaries (the municipality where the station is located). For each market
delineation, the number of observations dropswhen calculating the trimmed range as the sample
is restricted tomarket-quarters where at least four prices are observed. Prices are least dispersed
with the two-mile driving distance delineation, and most dispersed with the ROL definition.
The SD is less dependent on how the market is defined, as expected. Although raw prices are
more dispersed than cleaned prices, the difference appears small.
3.3.4. Temporal price variation. Onequestion that arises iswhether price dispersion is caused
by permanent price differences across firms, or whether firms indeed employ mixed strategies.
We follow Chandra and Tappata (2011) and calculate a measure of rank reversals rrij for each
pair of stations i and j (provided that i and j are located in the same local market and that we
can observe the prices of both stations for at least two time periods). Let Tij denote the number
of periods where price information is available for both firms. Subscripts i and j are assigned to
the two stations so that pit ≥ p jt for most time periods. The measure of rank reversals is defined
as the proportion of observations with p jt > pit:
rrij = 1Tij
Tij∑
t=1
I{p jt>pit}.
Our results are in line with Chandra and Tappata (2011). When using raw prices, the station
that is cheaper most of the time charges higher prices in 10.5% of all time periods. Our measure
of rank reversals increases to 21.5% when analyzing cleaned prices instead of actual prices,
suggesting that firms are indeed mixing.
4. TESTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFORMATION AND PRICES
In this section, we apply both parametric and nonparametric techniques to test the predictions
derived in Section 2.
4.1. Information and the Price Level. The clearinghouse model presented in Section 2 pre-
dicts that prices pit charged by gasoline station i decrease with the share of informed consumers
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TABLE 3
REGRESSION RESULTS ON PRICE LEVELS (DELINEATION: TWO MILES)
Markets with Markets with
Dependent Variable: Full Sample at Least Two Stations at Least Four Stations
Price Level (Diesel) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
μ −1.862*** −2.742*** −1.576*** −2.392*** −1.594*** −2.673***
(0.315) (0.329) (0.373) (0.393) (0.519) (0.520)
Number of Rival Firms (Nc) −0.012 −0.018** −0.008 −0.016* −0.013 −0.024**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Time Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No Yes No
Brent Price in Euro 0.220*** 0.221*** 0.224***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.011)
Constant 73.084*** 74.095*** 72.988*** 74.151*** 72.623*** 74.197***
(0.369) (0.413) (0.458) (0.498) (0.594) (0.642)
Number of Observations 21,905 21,905 14,851 14,851 7,996 7,996
R2 0.804 0.171 0.805 0.166 0.809 0.166
NOTES: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Random effects regressions include station- and region-specific charac-
teristics, state fixed effects, as well as dummy variables for missing exogenous variables. Models (1), (3), and (5) include
time fixed effects.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
μi (Remark 1). In order to test this prediction, we estimate the following linear regression:
pit = α + τμi +Xitψ + κit,(8)
whereXit represents possible confounding factors at the station or regional level as well as over
time. Specifically, Xit includes the number of rival stations in the local market as a measure of
the competitive environment, and station-specific control variables, such as indicator variables
for brand names (10), dummy variables for (other) station characteristics (whether the station
has a service bay, a car wash facility, a shop, self-service or is open 24 hours a day, whether the
station is dealer owned, or located on a highway), and the station’s number of pumps. Regional
variables include data on the population density and on tourism at the municipality level as well
as state fixed effects (7). Fluctuations of crude oil prices are controlled for by including either
price quotes for Brent crude oil or time fixed effects, depending on the model specification.
Table 3 presents the results. The first and second columns contain results using the entire
sample, whereas the third and fourth (fifth and sixth) columns show results when restricting
the sample to stations where the prices of at least one (three) rival firm(s) in the local market
are available. All regressions include either time fixed effects (first, third, and fifth columns) or
the crude oil price index (second, fourth, and sixth columns). The parameter estimates on the
share of informed consumers μ are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in all
model specifications, suggesting that a larger share of informed consumers does reduce price
levels. The point estimates vary between −2.7 and −1.6: Going from no informed consumers
to all consumers being informed would therefore reduce prices by about two cents.
The parameter estimates on the number of rival firmsNc are always negative, but significantly
different from zero in some specifications only. As discussed in Subsection 2.2, although our
clearinghousemodel predicts a positive impact ofNc, models that are richer in their information
structure (or that account for the fact that the search cost s depends negatively on N) tend to
predict a negative effect. As expected (and documented in the existing empirical literature, see
Eckert, 2013), crude oil prices exert a positive and highly significant impact on retail price levels.
4.2. Information and Price Dispersion. Our prediction of an inverse-U–shaped relationship
between price dispersion PDit and the share of informed consumers μi in station i’s market
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TABLE 4
REGRESSION RESULTS USING RESIDUAL PRICES TO CALCULATE DISPERSION AND A MARKET DELINEATION OF TWO MILES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VOIM VOI Range Trimmed Range SD AD
μ 1.705*** 1.709*** 2.994*** 4.192*** 0.913*** 0.851***
(0.300) (0.460) (0.586) (0.555) (0.237) (0.264)
μ2 −1.210*** −1.182*** −2.046*** −2.971*** −0.600*** −0.594***
(0.249) (0.388) (0.489) (0.460) (0.200) (0.225)
Number of Rival Firms with Prices (Nco) 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.122*** 0.060*** 0.018*** 0.007***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Number of Rival Firms (Nc) 0.004* 0.005 0.016*** 0.024*** 0.005*** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Constant −0.575*** −0.605*** −1.075*** −1.616*** −0.232*** −0.095
(0.109) (0.173) (0.221) (0.220) (0.088) (0.101)
Lower Bound 0.214 0.214 0.214 0.329 0.214 0.214
Slope at Lower Bound 1.186 1.203 2.118 2.240 0.656 0.597
t 6.070 4.047 5.558 8.564 4.292 3.515
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Upper Bound 0.967 0.967 0.967 0.967 0.967 0.967
Slope at Upper Bound −0.637 −0.578 −0.965 −1.556 −0.247 −0.299
t −3.320 −1.881 −2.553 −4.393 −1.567 −1.661
p 0.001 0.030 0.005 0.000 0.059 0.048
Overall Inverse-U Test
t 3.32 1.88 2.55 4.39 1.57 1.66
p 0.001 0.030 0.005 0.000 0.059 0.048
Extreme (μˆ = −βˆ/2γˆ) 0.704 0.723 0.732 0.706 0.761 0.716
Number of obervations 14,851 14,851 14,851 7,996 14,851 14,851
R2 0.260 0.136 0.280 0.370 0.172 0.104
NOTES: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include station- and region-specific characteristics, state
and time fixed effects, as well as dummy variables for missing exogenous variables.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
(Proposition 1) can be tested by estimating the following linear regression model:
PDit = α + βμi + γμ2i +Xitθ + ηit,
where Xit includes the same confounding factors at the station and at the regional level as in
the regression on price levels above (see Equation (8)), as well as time fixed effects.
The main parameters of interest are β and γ. An inverse-U–shaped relationship between
price dispersion and information would imply that β > 0 and γ < 0. According to the parameter
estimates reported in Table 4 (where local markets are defined using a two-mile critical driving
distance), this proposition is supported by the data: The parameter estimates for β (γ) are
positive (negative) and statistically significant at the 1% level in all specifications. As the share
of informed consumers increases, price dispersion first increases and then starts decreasing once
μ exceeds a critical level, which lies between 0.70 and 0.76.
The number of rival firms Nc has a positive effect on all measures of price dispersion.24
Although this result is broadly in line with the predictions of our theoretical model, one should
keep in mind the concerns raised at the end of Subsection 2.2.
In order to test formally for the presence of an inverse-U–shaped relationship between
information and price dispersion, we apply the statistical test suggested in Lind and Mehlum
24 We also control for the number of rival firms where prices are observed in a particular period, Nco, as some
measures of price dispersion (such as the sample range) increase mechanically if the number of price observations
increases, holding fixed the number of rival firms Nc in the market.
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TABLE 5
REGRESSION RESULTS USING RESIDUAL PRICES TO CALCULATE DISPERSION AND A MARKET DELINEATION OF 50% RELATIVE
OVERLAP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VOIM VOI Range Trimmed Range SD AD
μ 3.363*** 3.154*** 5.575*** 8.499*** 1.301*** 1.344***
(0.411) (0.602) (0.768) (0.862) (0.305) (0.357)
μ2 −2.739*** −2.614*** −4.517*** −6.881*** −1.073*** −0.997***
(0.343) (0.507) (0.648) (0.768) (0.257) (0.298)
Number of Rival Firms with Prices (Nco) 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.090*** 0.056*** 0.010*** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of Rival Firms (Nc) 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.001*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Constant −0.599*** −0.538** −0.979*** −3.087*** −0.060 −0.039
(0.143) (0.213) (0.272) (0.282) (0.106) (0.128)
Overall Inverse-U Test
t 7.20 4.71 6.14 7.25 3.79 2.45
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007
Extreme (μˆ = −βˆ/2γˆ) 0.614 0.603 0.617 0.618 0.607 0.674
Number of Observations 13,980 13,980 13,980 7,840 13,980 13,980
R2 0.335 0.194 0.378 0.543 0.169 0.097
NOTES: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions include station- and region-specific characteristics, state
and time fixed effects, as well as dummy variables for missing exogenous variables.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
(2010).25 This test calculates the slope of the estimation equation at both ends of the distribution
of the explanatory variable (μ). A positive slope for low values of the information measure and
a negative slope after a certain threshold (μ¯) would imply an inverse-U–shaped relationship
between information and price dispersion. The test is an intersection-union test as the null
hypothesis is that the parameter vector is contained in a union of specified sets.
The results are reported in Table 4. At the lower bound of our set of observations, the slope is
positive and significantly different from zero at the 1% level for all measures of price dispersion.
At the upper bound, the slope is negative in all specifications. It is significantly different from
zero at the 1% level for the VOIM, R, and TR measures, at the 5% level for the VOI and AD
measures, and at the 10% level for the SD measure.
Using the ROL approach to market definition delivers even stronger results. With an ROL
threshold of 50%, the parameter estimates on μ (μ2) are positive (negative) and statistically
significant, and the intersection-union test is rejected at a 1% significance level for all measures
of price dispersion. These results are summarized in Table 5.
Comparing the magnitude of the coefficient estimates on μ and μ2 across the models, we find
that the (absolute values of the) parameters are largest for R and TR and lowest for SD and
AD. This is due to the fact that R and TR are more dispersed than SD and AD, as the first two
measures (and, to a lesser extent, VOIM and VOI) are more affected by extreme values in the
local price distribution.
The inverse-U–shaped relationship between our measures of informed consumers and price
dispersion suggests that price dispersion is significantly smaller in markets where firms have
mainly either informed or uninformed consumers. For markets with intermediate levels of
consumer information, our findings clearly reject the law of one price.
4.2.1. Robustness. In order to confirm that our results are not driven by using residual instead
of raw prices, by the specific product, by specific assumptions imposed on the error term, by the
25 Lind and Mehlum (2010) argue that although a positive linear and a negative quadratic term supports a con-
cave relationship between two variables, it is not sufficient to guarantee an inverse-U–shaped relationship since the
relationship may be concave but still monotone in the relevant range.
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NOTES: This figure presents Nadaraya–Watson estimates of the function g(μi) in Equation (9) and 95% confidence
bands using an Epanechnikov kernel. The panels correspond to the six parametric specifications in Table 3.
FIGURE 5
SEMIPARAMETRIC EVIDENCE ON THE PRICE LEVEL [COLOR FIGURE CAN BE VIEWED AT WILEYONLINELIBRARY.COM]
way in which we delineate local markets, by particular subsamples, or by the approach used to
calculate the measure of consumer information μ, we have carried out a number of robustness
checks. Below, we summarize the results of these robustness exercises, referring the reader to
Appendix S2 (available online) for detailed descriptions of the various model alterations, more
thorough discussions, and tables of results.
First, we investigate the relationship between consumer information and price dispersion
using raw instead of residual prices. Second, we perform the same regressions using regular
gasoline instead of diesel. Third, the (implicit) assumption that all observations are indepen-
dent from one another may be violated as our measures of price dispersion are calculated by
comparing the price of a gasoline station with prices charged by other stations in the local
market. We provide a sensitivity analysis that addresses this issue by accounting for potential
spatial correlation of the residuals within local markets. Fourth, we define local markets using
administrative boundaries (municipalities) and a smaller critical distance (1.5 miles instead of 2
miles). When using the ROL approach to defining local markets, we use different thresholds to
decide whether two stations are in the same local market. Fifth, we analyze alternative samples
by excluding larger municipalities as well as stations located on highways, by including gaso-
line stations located in Vienna, and by restricting attention to local markets with at least three
gasoline stations.
Last, we use alternative ways to calculate our measure of consumer information μ: (1) We
do not weight commuter flows by the share of possible routes passing by a particular gasoline
stations. (2) We consider different levels of informedness, based on the number of stations
sampled by each commuter relative to the total number of stations in a local market, instead of
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FIGURE 6
SEMIPARAMETRIC EVIDENCE ON PRICE DISPERSION [COLOR FIGURE CAN BE VIEWED AT WILEYONLINELIBRARY.COM]
assuming that commuters are perfectly informed about all prices. (3) We account for the fact
that long-distance commuters (may) drive through many local markets and therefore pass by
a larger number of gasoline stations. As commuters passing by many gasoline stations are less
likely to visit a particular one, these commuter flows receive lower weights when calculating
this alternative measure of consumer information. (4) We use different values for the critical
distance dist when assigning commuter flows to gasoline stations.
The main result of our analysis—an inverse-U–shaped relationship between consumer infor-
mation and price dispersion—remains unaffected by these modifications.
4.3. Semiparametric Evidence. In this section, we show that our results on the relationship
between information and the price level (respectively, price dispersion) are not driven by the
parametric restriction to a linear (respectively, linear–quadratic) function. Given the large
number of control variables, we follow a semiparametric approach: We still restrict attention to
a linear specification for the vector of controls, but do not impose any parametric restrictions
on the relationship between price levels (respectively, price dispersion) and information μ. We
estimate the following equations semiparametrically:
pit = α + g(μi) +Xitψ + κit,(9)
PDit = α + f (μi) +Xitθ + ηit.(10)
INFORMATION AND PRICE DISPERSION 891
Savings in EUR
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
50
00
0
15
00
00
Commuters
Non−Commuters
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
µ
Sh
ar
e 
of
 S
ur
pl
us
A
B
C
NOTES: The left panel shows the savings distribution for commuters and noncommuters implied by the clearinghouse
model, taking into account variation in market structure and information. The right panel shows the distribution of
surplus in a market with four firms as a function of μ. Noncommuters receive Area C, commuters B plus C. Firms earn
the residual area, depending on the type of consumer they face.
FIGURE 7
DISTRIBUTION OF SAVINGS
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
p−pmin
F(
p−
p m
in
)
µ=.35
µ=.60
µ=.82
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
pmax−pmin
F(
p m
a
x−
p m
in
)
NOTES: The left panel shows the distribution function of the VOI and the right panel of the price range. In both panels,
the distribution functions are shown for four firms and the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles of μ.
FIGURE 8
DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS FOR THE VALUE OF INFORMATION (VOI) AND PRICE RANGE
We use the two-step procedure proposed by Robinson (1988). We first obtain nonparametric
estimates of E(p |μ) and E(X|μ) and then regress p − E(p |μ) on X − E(X|μ) to obtain a
consistent estimate of ψ . We then regress p − E(X|μ)ψ̂ on μ nonparametrically to obtain an
estimate of g(·). Similarly, we obtain an estimate of f (·).
The results obtained for the nonparametric component of the price-level regression (Equa-
tion (9)) are illustrated in Figure 5. The samples and included explanatory variables correspond
to the specifications reported in Table 3. Figure 5 shows a strong, negative, and close-to-linear
relationship between consumer information (horizontal axis) and the price level (vertical axis).
Figure 6 reports results obtained for the nonparametric component of the price dispersion
regression (Equation (10)). The restriction to a linear–quadratic function results in a peak
further to the right than with a flexible functional form. Although the specific form of the
relationship between information (horizontal axis) and different measures of price dispersion
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(vertical axis) depends on the measure of price dispersion, there is strong evidence in favor of
an inverse-U shape for the relationship of interest.26
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have studied, both theoretically and empirically, the relationship between consumer
information and prices. We have shown that classic clearinghouse models generate an inverse-
U–shaped relationship between the share of informed consumers and price dispersion, and
a decreasing relationship between consumer information and price levels. In order to test
those theoretical predictions, we have constructed a novel measure of the share of informed
consumers in the market for retail gasoline. This measure relies on detailed data on commuting
patterns and on the idea that commuters can freely sample prices at gasoline stations along
their commuting path. Our approach thus differs from earlier approaches, which have primarily
relied on Internet usage or on a comparison of online and offline markets to examine the effect
of consumer information on prices. We have found robust statistical evidence supporting our
theoretical predictions, thus validating the information mechanism in clearinghouse models.
It is worth emphasizing that our new measure captures variation in information on the
consumers’ side but not on the firms’ side of the market. Our empirical setting therefore comes
very close to the thought experiment of varying the share of informed consumers in a classic
clearinghouse model. In many other real-world settings, however, more transparency on the
consumers’ side, for example, due to price comparison apps, also makes it easier for firms
to monitor each other’s prices. In such settings, increased transparency may thus facilitate
collusion, resulting in higher prices.
We conclude by illustrating the quantitative implications of price dispersion generated by
the heterogeneity of consumer information. We restrict attention to the Varian model, which
does not require an estimate of the search cost s. The model implies a fixed surplus equaling
willingness to pay per liter less marginal cost per liter v − c, which we set equal to 2.4 euro
cents.27 We distribute commuters equally among gas stations on their commuting path, and
noncommuters equally among gas stations in their municipality of residence. According to the
Austrian Micro-Census carried out in the years 2003 and 2004, households drove 52.5 billion
km per year. From our commuting data, we obtain the share of this distance that was driven for
commuting purposes, namely, 25%.The remaining driving distance is distributed equally among
commuters and noncommuters. Assuming a fuel consumption of 0.079 L/km, also obtained from
the Micro-Census, we can compute total annual fuel consumption for each type of consumer.
We begin by computing the savings of each type of consumer relative to a situation with
no information. Overall, commuters save € 36.4 million and noncommuters save € 15 million
per year. The implied individual savings are small, with average expenses reduced by € 26.42
per commuter and € 6.07 per noncommuter. As a share of total fuel expenses, this amounts to
only 2.23% for commuters and 1.01% for noncommuters. These figures almost double when
we consider net fuel prices, as taxes account for more than 50% of fuel costs.
The left panel in Figure 7, which illustrates the distribution of savings for the two consumer
groups, shows that savings vary substantially within groups as well. This is driven by variation
both in the share of informed consumers and in market structure.
In order to illustrate the effect of information alone, the right panel of Figure 7 shows how
surplus is distributed between sellers, informed and uninformed consumers in a market with the
median number of firms, N = 4, as a function of the share of informed consumers μ. The share
of surplus uninformed consumers receive in expectation is given by Area C, whereas informed
consumers receive B plus C. Firms earn the gray Area A from facing informed consumers and
A plus B from dealing with uninformed consumers. At the sample median value of μ = 0.6,
26 We are not aware of a nonparametric test for an inverse-U shape corresponding to the parametric test of Lind and
Mehlum (2010). Recently, Kostyshak (2015) suggested a critical-bandwidth approach in nonparametric regression.
27 This corresponds to the estimate in regression (4) in Table 3.
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informed consumers obtain 72% of total surplus, whereas uninformed consumers receive 42%.
For low values of μ, informed consumers benefit from increasing information; for larger μ,
the increase in surplus of the uninformed is more pronounced. The figure thus illustrates that
although the effect of information accounts for a small share of total expenses, the impact on
the distribution of surplus is substantial, even when the share of informed consumers is small.
Finally, we illustrate the distribution of the benefit of being informed across purchases in a
market with themedian number of firms,N = 4. Specifically, we plot the cumulative distribution
function of the VOI, F (p − pmin), in the left panel of Figure 8 for the 5th, 50th, and 95th per-
centiles of μ. The figure illustrates that the maximal benefit from being informed (1.37,1.71,1.89
for the three values of μ, respectively) is larger in markets with more informed consumers. This
is due to the minimum price being lower in such markets. The distributions have a mass point at
zero, as an uninformed consumer obtains the lowest price in a four-firmmarket with probability
1/4. For the median μ (0.6), the value of being informed is worth at least one cent per liter 37%
of the time, although this is only the case 29% of the time in markets with the 5th-percentile
μ (0.35). The absence of a dominance relationship between the three distributions reflects the
nonmonotonic relationship between information and price dispersion.
The right panel of Figure 8 shows the distribution of the range of prices,F (pmax − pmin).Here,
the results are stronger and they can be interpreted as the benefit the “unluckiest” consumer
would derive from becoming informed. That benefit is at least one cent 76% of the time in the
median market, whereas this is only the case 50% of the time when μ is at the 5th percentile.
Overall, these simulation results demonstrate that consumer information can have substantial
distributional effects across consumer groups, within consumer groups, and across purchases.
APPENDIX
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1. All we need to do is prove the following lemma:
LEMMA A.1. For all μ ∈ (0, 1) and N ≥ 2, let A(μ) = ∫ 10 dz1+ μ1−μNzN−1 . Then, μ ∈ (0, 1) →
A(μ)
1−A(μ) − 1−μμ is strictly decreasing.
PROOF. For all x > 0 andN ≥ 2, letB(x) ≡ ∫ 10 dz1+xNzN−1 ∈ ( 11+xN , 1). Clearly,A(μ) = B(μ/(1 −
μ)) for every μ, and A(μ)1−A(μ) − 1−μμ is strictly decreasing in μ on (0, 1) if and only if g(x) ≡
B(x)
1−B(x) − 1x is strictly decreasing in x on (0,∞).
Note that
B′(x) = −
∫ 1
0
NzN−1
(1 + xNzN−1)2
dz
= 1
x(N − 1)
(
1
1 + xN − B(x)
)
,(A.1)
where the second line follows by integrating by parts. Therefore, if we define
φ(y, x) = 1
x(N − 1)
(
1
1 + xN − y
)
,(A.2)
then B is a solution of the differential equation y′ = φ(y, x) on the interval (0,∞).
For all x > 0, g′(x) = B′(x)(1−B(x))2 + 1x2 . Using Equation (A.1), we see that g′(x) is strictly negative
if and only if P(B(x)) < 0, where
P(Y) ≡ x(1 − Y(1 + xN)) + (1 − Y)2(N − 1)(1 + xN) ∀Y ∈ R.
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P(·) is strictly convex and P(1) < 0 < P(1/(1 + xN)). Hence, there exists a unique root (x) ∈
(1/(1 + xN), 1) such that P(·) is strictly positive on (1/(1 + xN), (x)) and strictly negative on
((x), 1). (x) is given by
(x) = 1 + x
2(N − 1)
⎛⎝1 −
√
1 + 4N(N − 1)
1 + xN
⎞⎠.
Since B(x) ∈ (1/(1 + xN), 1), it follows that g′(x) < 0 if and only if B(x) > (x).
Next, we show that B(x) > (x) when x is in the neighborhood of 0. Applying Taylor’s
theorem to (x) for x → 0+, we obtain:
(x) = 1 − x+ 2N
2
2N − 1
x2
2
− 6N
3(1 − 3N + 3N2)
(2N − 1)3
x3
6
+ o(x3),
where o(x3) is Landau’s little-o. Differentiating B three times under the integral sign and
applying Taylor’s theorem for x → 0+, we obtain:
B(x) = 1 − x+ 2N
2
2N − 1
x2
2
− 6N
3
3N − 2
x3
6
+ o(x3).(A.3)
It follows that
B(x) − (x) = x3
(
N3
17N3 − 27N2 + 15N − 3
(2N − 1)3(3N − 2) + o(1)
)
.
Since N3 17N
3−27N2+15N−3
(2N−1)3(3N−2) > 0 for all N ≥ 2, there exists x0 > 0 such that B(x) − (x) > 0 for all
x ∈ (0, x0].
Next, we show that B(x) − (x) > 0 for all x > x0. We establish this by showing that  is a
subsolution of differential equation y′ = φ(y, x) on [x0,∞).  is a subsolution of this differential
equation if and only if ′(x) < φ((x), x) for all x ≥ x0. ′(x) − φ((x), x) is given by
N
√
(1 +Nx)(1 + 4N(N − 1) +Nx)((x+ 2)N − 1) − (1 + 4N(N − 1) + 2N3x+N2x2)
2(N − 1)2(1 +Nx)√(1 +Nx)(1 + 4N(N − 1) +Nx) .
This expression is strictly negative if and only if
(1 +Nx)(1 + 4N(N − 1) +Nx)((x+ 2)N − 1)2 − (1 + 4N(N − 1) + 2N3x+N2x2)2 < 0.
Simplifying the left-hand side yields −4N2(N − 1)4x2, which is indeed strictly negative.
We can conclude: B is a solution of differential equation y′ = φ(y, x) on [x0,∞),  is a
subsolution of the same differential equation, andB(x0) > (x0); by lemma 1.2 in Teschl (2012),
B(x) > (x) for all x > x0. 
A.2. Constructing Variables.
A.2.1. Weighting commuter flows. In order to calculate the number of potential routes, we
have to identify which stations are on the same route. Two stations i and j that comply with
Equation (6) are on one route from o to d if the optimal route between the two municipalities,
which passes through both stations, is not excessively longer than the optimal route from o to
d passing through one station only.
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We order stations i and j so that distoi ≤ distoj . (Recall that distkl is the length of the optimal
route between two locations k and l.) We view stations i and j as being on the same route if
distoi + distij + distjd −min(distoi + distid,distoj + distjd) < dist.(A.4)
Multiple stations are on the same route if all pairs of stations comply with Equation (A.4).
If, for a particular commuter flow, at least one station complies with Equation (6), then each
potential route contains at least one station.28 Two potential routes between o and d are viewed
as separate if at least one station located on one route is not included in the other (and vice
versa).
The weight of a commuter flow from o to d assigned to station i, ωi,od, equals the share of
potential routes that include station i (and equals zero if i does not comply with Equation (6)).
More formally, letRod be the set of potential routes for a commuter flow from o to d. A potential
route Rod ∈ Rod for this commuter flow enumerates all the gasoline stations that are passed by
along this route. The weight assigned to station i for the commuter flow from o to d is defined
as:
ωi,od = 1|Rod|
∑
Rod∈Rod
1i∈Rod .
As the shortest path algorithm is applied to transit commuters only, we set ωi,od = 1 if station
i is located in either municipality o or d. The aggregated weighted number of commuters for
station i is given by
Ii =
∑
o
∑
d =o
ωi,odCod,
where Cod is the commuter flow from o to d.
A.2.2. ROL approach to market definition. As an alternative to delineating local markets
based on an exogenously chosen critical driving distance (twomiles in our baseline specification)
or on administrative boundaries, we exploit our data on commuting patterns to decide whether
two stations are part of the same local market.
Two stations i and j are viewed as being part of the same local market if the share of common
potential consumers for both stations (ROLij , the ROL between i and j) exceeds a certain
threshold. Noncommuters are considered to be potential consumers for i and j if the two
stations are located in the same municipality. A commuter flow between o and d gives rise to
overlapping potential consumers for i and j if it passes by both stations, that is, if i and j both
comply with Equation (6).
The ROL between two stations i and j is defined as:
ROLij = Consi ∧ ConsjConsi ∨ Consj ,
where Consi ∧ Consj denotes the number of individuals (including both commuters and non-
commuters) that are potential consumers for i and j , and Consi ∨ Consj the number of indi-
viduals that are potential consumers for i and/or j . We again construct a local market for each
station: Station i’s market contains station i itself and all other stations j = i for which ROLij
exceeds a critical value.
Figure A.1 contrasts the local markets obtained with a critical driving distance of two miles
with those obtained with an ROL threshold of 50%. The histograms show the number of pairs
28 We do not consider routes without stations when calculating these weights.
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NOTES: The figure shows the number of pairs of stations within bins of 0.1 miles driving distance. Gray bars indicate
the number of station pairs within a distance of up to two miles. White bars depict all station pairs within a distance
between two and eight miles. Black bars illustrate the number of pairs with an ROL, which is the share of common
(potential) consumers, above 50%.
FIGURE A.1
MARKET DEFINITION WITH A THRESHOLD DISTANCE OF TWO MILES AND A RELATIVE OVERLAP (ROL) OF 50%
of stations within bins of 0.1 miles driving distance for the entire cross section of gas stations in
Austria. The gray bars indicate all station pairs within a distance of up to two miles, whereas
the white bars depict all station pairs between two and eight miles. When delineating local
markets with a critical driving distance of two miles, all station pairs within that distance are
considered to be in the same market, as depicted by the gray bars. The black bars illustrate the
local markets obtained with an ROL threshold of 50%.
The figure indicates that the ROL approach to market definition gives rise to virtually all the
station pairs within a one-mile distance being in the same local market. However, it excludes
about 20 % of all the station pairs with a distance from one to two miles, while including some
pairs that are located further apart. Thus, although an ROL threshold of 50% results in larger
markets on average, there are many pairs of stations that are part of the same local market in
one market definition but not in the other, and vice versa.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Information section
at the end of the article.
Table S2.1:Regression results using raw prices to calculate dispersion and a market delineation
of 2 miles
Table S2.2: Regression results using residual prices to calculate dispersion for gasoline and a
market delineation of 2 miles
Table S2.3: Regression results using residual prices to calculate dispersion and a market delin-
eation of 2 miles accounting for spatial autocorrelation in the residuals
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Table S2.4: Regression results using residual prices to calculate dispersion and a market delin-
eation based on municipal borders
Table S2.5: Regression results using residual prices to calculate dispersion and a market delin-
eation of 1.5 miles
Table S2.6: Regression results using residual prices to calculate dispersion and a market
delineation of 10% relative overlap
Table S2.7: Regression results using residual prices to calculate dispersion and a market delin-
eation of 90% relative overlap
Table S2.8: Regression results using residual prices to calculate dispersion and a market delin-
eation of 2 miles, excluding 3 largest towns (apart from Vienna)
Table S2.9: Regression results using residual prices to calculate dispersion and a market
delineation of 2 miles, excl. highway stations
Table S2.10: Regression results using residual prices to calculate dispersion and a market
delineation of 2 miles, including Vienna
Table S2.11:Regression results using residual prices and a market delineation of 2 miles, prices
of at least 2 competitors observed
Table S2.12: Regression results using residual prices to calculate dispersion and a market
delineation of 2 miles, no route-weights
Table S2.13: Regression results using residual prices to calculate dispersion and a market
delineation of 2 miles, using different degrees of informedness
Table S2.14: Regression results using residual prices to calculate dispersion and a market
delineation of 2 miles, using different degrees of informedness (locals are assumed to sample 1
station)
Table S2.15: Regression results using residual prices to calculate dispersion and a market
delineation of 2 miles, using alternative weights
Table S2.16: Regression results using residual prices to calculate dispersion and a market
delineation of 2 miles, dist = 50m
Table S2.17: Regression results using residual prices to calculate dispersion and a market
delineation of 2 miles, dist = 50m
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